The prototype can already check and sign a transaction on signet. Phase 8, signing, is nearly finished: two of the three test transactions it asks for have confirmed. This page covers what comes after.
8 of 11 phases done.
Phase 0Setup and baseline✓Done
Phase 2Touch input and on-screen controls✓Done
Phase 3QR scanner on the camera board✓Done
Phase 4One-way camera link✓Done
Phase 5Keys (stateless seed)✓Done
Phase 6Address check screen✓Done
Phase 7Reading and checking transactions✓Done
Phase 8Signing and returning the transaction◐In progress
Phase 10Path to the final hardware○Planned
The goal is to close the obvious prototype gaps and write down the threat model. Planned:
- A build guard. A check that inspects the compiled firmware for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth functions, and fails the build if any appear. It runs on every build.
- A release build with all serial output switched off, including what the chip prints after a crash, which could contain fragments of secrets.
- An optional session PIN, set when the seed is loaded and needed again after the idle lock. Nothing is stored.
- A boot screen showing the firmware’s hash (SHA-256), so you can compare it with a published value.
- Physical advice: after flashing, power the device from a battery, a power bank or a power-only USB cable.
- A written threat model: what’s being protected, who the attackers are (malware on the computer, malicious transactions, physical access, the supply chain), what each phase defends against, and the ESP32’s known limits.
- Secure boot and flash encryption: research and documentation only. On the ESP32 they permanently burn settings into the chip. They would be tried only on a spare board, and only with the project owner’s explicit approval.
The ESP32 was chosen to learn on, not to stay on. Phase 10 is a written plan covering:
- Candidate chips with security features, for example an STM32 with Arm TrustZone.
- Secure elements, and what they can and can’t do for Bitcoin’s maths. Some support only a different curve, so they’d guard a PIN or a secret rather than sign.
- What carries over: the Bitcoin, QR and UR code and the user-interface logic are portable. The display, touch and camera drivers are not.
- Camera options for the new chip.
- Reproducible builds and signed firmware updates, delivered only by QR or SD card and verified on the device.
The real Bitcoin network (mainnet) stays disabled in the firmware until every item is done:
- Not done: an independent audit
- Not done: all test fixtures passing
- Not done: a reproducible build
- Not done: the project owner’s explicit sign-off
None of these is done today. Until then: signet only, and never real funds.
Two more boards are in the pipeline. Both are planned only: not built, and not yet researched for this project. What’s listed is from each maker’s own product pages.
○PlannedNot built, not yet researched
ESP32-S3 camera board
Espressif lists a camera interface, PSRAM, secure boot and flash encryption for the ESP32-S3. The idea to explore is whether one board could do the job of the current two, with protections this prototype doesn't have yet.
Like the current boards, the ESP32-S3 has Wi-Fi and Bluetooth radios.
○PlannedNot built, not yet researched
Raspberry Pi Pico 2 (RP2350)
Raspberry Pi lists boot signing with the key fingerprint in one-time-programmable memory, and Arm TrustZone, for the RP2350. The plain Pico 2 has no radio; only the Pico 2 W does.
Its product page doesn't mention a camera interface, so how it would scan QR codes is an open question.